Korean Reunification

Introduction

                 The obstacles to a Korean reunification are multifold and the Korean peninsula, divided for more than seventy years, is stuck in a time warp.[1] There are five major powers whose national interests and bilateral and multilateral relationships must be considered in any scenario regarding the future of the Korean Peninsula. The most important regional powers with the greatest stakes and responsibilities in a unification scenario are South Korea, China, and the United States, and Japan and Russia may play an important role. Understanding the geopolitical landscape and key concerns of these countries helps clarify possible areas of cooperation in the event of a North Korean collapse or in the case of a gradual unification. Is U.S.-China cooperation a prerequisite for solving the Korean problem? Unlike the United States and China, Japan and Russia are not likely to affect the Korean issue directly and significantly. However, these powers could contribute to its resolution.

For the North to give up its nuclear weapons would require normalization between the United States and the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) and a peace treaty on the Korean Peninsula between the United States, China and the two Koreas. In the past, the official position of the Republic of Korea has been the so-called “2+2” formula in which the two Koreas sign a peace treaty and the United States and China guarantee it. Would a four-party peace treaty on the Korean peninsula that includes an inter-Korean peace agreement, a U.S.-North Korea peace agreement, a U.S.-China peace agreement be possible with the help of Russia and Japan?

The purpose of this article is to explore the possibility of a Korean reunification from a European perspective. It is a modest attempt to analyse the methods that can be applied to make unification of Korea a reality through the scenario of collapse or a gradual peaceful process, by assessing the role of the United States, China, Russia, the two Koreas and Japan in a vision for a unified Korean peninsula.

         The United States

For many Europeans, why does America, that claims to love peace, still refuse to sign a treaty with North Korea and thus put a definitive end to the Korean War? This is the question that John Feffer, an American international relations expert, attempts to answer when interviewed by the South Korean newspaper The Korea Times in 2019.[2] It is known that North Korea wants a peace treaty with the United States and is making it one of the conditions for returning to talks on its nuclear program. According to John Feffer, the United States is not close to signing such a treaty not because it is worried about being disadvantaged in negotiations with North Korea, but for reasons related to U.S. domestic politics. On the surface, signing a peace treaty is a very easy decision to make. It is the domestic political situation in the United States that prohibits it from negotiating and signing a peace treaty. Under U.S. law, a peace treaty must receive a two-thirds vote in the Senate. The problem is that a number of senators do not want to sign a peace treaty with the DPRK.[3] Therefore, the DPRK should go to the American public first, as members of Congress are elected officials who are called to serve the interests of their constituencies. It is the opinion of the American public, not that of the administration, that determines whether or not a peace treaty should be signed with Pyongyang.[4] The DPRK should practice a kind of public diplomacy and engage in a charm offensive designed to win the hearts of the American people, a utopia today.

There are three particularly important American interests in East Asia (Carpenter 2004, 148).  The first is to prevent a single power from dominating the region. East Asian nations have large populations, significant military forces, and an impressive (and growing) array of economic and technological capabilities. A regional hegemon capable of controlling these vast assets could pose a serious threat to America’s security and economic well-being. The second important interest is that a reasonable degree of order and stability exists in the region. An East Asia habitually rocked by armed conflict would be a difficult and unpleasant neighbor for America. As long as the problems in the region are not excessively violent and disruptive, America’s interests are relatively safe. The third important interest is economic. East Asia is now the most important region for U.S. international trade, having surpassed Western Europe in the 1990s. Ten of America’s 24 largest trading partners are located in the region (the People’s Republic of China, third; Japan, fourth; the Republic of Korea, sixth; Taiwan, eighth; Hong Kong, sixteenth; Thailand, nineteenth; the Philippines, twenty-third).[5] Many of these East Asian countries are also important arenas for American investment. Maintaining and even strengthening this set of economic ties is an interest that Washington cannot ignore.

           Between the bomb and the United States: China

             Many people, including politicians and academics in the Republic of Korea, suspect that the Chinese government prefers a divided Korean peninsula to a unified one. And some people have speculated that if China becomes stronger and more confident, the Chinese government might develop different views and policies (Joo 2017, 20). China might be much less concerned about the possible destabilizing effect of Korean reunification. In fact, the Korean issue is so complicated that it cannot be determined by the Chinese government itself, but by the overall China-U.S. relationship, the stage of China’s own reunification with Taiwan, Chinese-Japanese relations, and the prospect of military ties between a unified Korea and the United States. The North Korean nuclear challenge is now seen as a deterrence rather than a denuclearization issue. What would be China’s role, given its rivalry with the United States? What are the best policies for regional actors to achieve their goals, peace on the Korean Peninsula and, more broadly, regional stability and international security?

China’s rise to power is a major development in current world affairs, especially in East Asian international relations. With the world’s largest population and foreign exchange reserves, second largest economy and second largest military budget, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is now advocating a grand “Chinese dream” that openly calls for a rejuvenation of China’s past power and glory.

Fundamentally conditioned by the China-U.S. relationship from the very beginning, Chinese foreign policy toward the Korean Peninsula in general and North Korea in particular has been complex, dynamic, but understandable. In the absence of major changes in China-U.S. relations and fundamental changes within the PRC, Beijing is likely to prefer the survival of the DPRK regime for its political and strategic needs, while developing an increasingly close relationship with the Republic of Korea (ROK) for important economic interests and as a counterweight to Japan and the United States. In the spring of 2016, PRC leader Xi Jinping reaffirmed that for his Asian dream, “China would absolutely not allow chaos on the Korean Peninsula” (Global Times, 2016, 12). However, the uncertainties and complications in China -U.S. relations and the growing discord between China and Japan are likely to further develop to affect and profoundly reshape China’s strategic calculus regarding the Korean Peninsula. Beijing has already appeared to accept a nuclear North Korea.

China indeed has much more power over North Korea as the “largest and most dominant” foreign donor and patron, literally “feeding” the DPRK (Kim 2017, 137). Yet, with no real confidence in Seoul’s future strategic reorientation in the context of the China-U.S. competition, and also fearing the consequences of a DPRK collapsing with the bomb, Beijing still does not seem to have the strategic intent or political will to actually apply its potentially decisive, but probably unique, pressure to seriously cripple North Korea and subdue it on the nuclear issue. Strengthening rather than reducing U.S. power in Northeast Asia, even if it does not negatively impact China’s national interest, is categorically unacceptable to the CCP (Chinese Communist Party). Once again, the CCP’s political needs and calculations dictate Chinese foreign policy. Perhaps, too, Beijing seems to know what some U.S. analysts have concluded: “North Korea has never been serious about giving up a nuclear program…which it considered vital for regime protection and internal legitimacy” (Kim 2017, 139).

To pursue the CCP’s political interest and China’s national interest, which are in conflict with each other on the issue of North Korea’s nuclear program, Beijing seems often tired of the DPRK and increasingly frustrated, but still “unable to abandon” Pyongyang (Jian 2017, 119). This is especially true since China does not yet have its much desired “rich country and strong army” to rid the CCP of its eternal fear of the regime’s non-survival. (Jian 2017, 120) Stuck in its never-ending struggle to resist, reduce, and replace U.S. power and leadership, Beijing thus ironically allows and even funds the North Korean bomb, negating much of the geopolitical gains made by China’s prosperous economy and rapid build-up of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in East Asia.[6]

         Russia

“North Korea would rather eat grass than give up nuclear weapons.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin once stated a North Korean perspective during a press conference on the sidelines of the 9th BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) Summit in the southeastern city of Xiamen, Tuesday, September 5, 2017. The future of Korea is of great concern to Russia because of the geostrategic importance of the Korean peninsula and South Korea’s alliance relationship with the United States: how has Russia’s Korea policy changed over the years? What is Russia’s position on North Korea’s nuclear ambitions? Will Russia support Korean unification?

First, Russia does not want an outside power to become dominant in Korea and pose a threat to its Far East region. Second, Russia prefers a status quo on the Korean peninsula and will most likely oppose Korean unification. According to several observers, Russia will accept North Korea’s status as a de facto nuclear-armed state rather than attempt regime change or state collapse in the North (Charles 2005, 522). During his first years in power, Putin sought to project his image as a peacemaker on the Korean peninsula. He normalized relations between Moscow and Pyongyang, cultivated a cordial relationship with Kim Jong-Il and volunteered to mediate between the isolated North Korea and the outside world (Zhebin 2017, 150). Putin has followed the principles of pragmatism, realism and a balanced approach in dealing with the Korean issue. As a result, Putin’s Russia has maintained a neutral and balanced relationship with North and South Korea. This balanced approach has not alienated Seoul, but neither has it won Pyongyang’s full confidence.

Russia supports Korean unification. But Putin will only support Korean unification if it is done peacefully, gradually and without outside intervention (Zhebin 2017, 155). Russia also insists that Seoul and Pyongyang must negotiate as equals to achieve Korean unification. In addition, Russia makes its support for a unified Korea conditional on its country’s neutrality or friendship. The chances of these conditions being met at the time of Korean unification are almost nil. The crucial question, therefore, is whether Russia would support Korean unification.

         South Korea

          How much freedom would South Koreans be willing to give up (or would they need to give up) to live in a unified Korea? Would North Korea’s leaders really agree to join a political system that guarantees individual rights when North Korean citizens currently have none? More fundamentally, is it possible to politically merge a democracy and a family dictatorship? What does South Korea think of North Korea? If the international press is to be believed, the DPRK is a pervasive source of fear south of the border. Seoul is barely fifty kilometers from a “crazy” nuclear-armed state and the North and South are still technically at war. It is also generally accepted that, despite this rancor, the ultimate reunification of North and South must be the dream of all Koreans.

However, things are much more nuanced than that. South Korean governments have taken a number of approaches to the North Korean issue, ranging from outright hostility to the “sunshine policy” of Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Moon Jae-in (Harrison 2003, 45). The people themselves are also divided. The war generation tends to be driven by fear and hatred of North Korea, and thus seeks a firm government response to any aggression from the North. The so-called “386” generation of baby boomers from the 1960s mostly favor rapprochement with “poor brother” Pyongyang. Those born in the 1970s and 1980s-the first generation to grow up without any sense of danger or capitalist vs. communist ideological struggle-are instinctively peace-seeking, but they are also more apathetic than the war generation or the 386 generation.[7] This in itself poses a problem for the possibility of reunification in the future. In the interviews, it was interesting to note the difference in opinion between the young people born after the war and the war veterans. For example, Jangnam Sohn, a 94-year-old war veteran living in Seoul, stated that his greatest wish is a reunification of the two countries before his death. On the other hand, Inmo Koo, a South Korean 25-year-old student at the University of Bordeaux in France, during an interview with other students, is rather skeptical about such a reunification and believes that it is too late and too costly for the two countries to be reunited.

It is increasingly common that many South Koreans do not even want reunification. Fewer and fewer people alive today can remember life before partition and have old friends or relatives to reunite with. Moreover, the economic divergence between North and South Korea means that the South would have to bear enormous costs for reunification.[8] Even the lowest estimates suggest an expenditure of more than one trillion U.S. dollars to bring North Korea’s infrastructure and quality of life up to near South Korean standards (Eberstadt 2015, 135).

The same survey by the Peace Research Institute in 2020 found that thirty percent of South Koreans now agree with the statement, “In the past, they [North Koreans] were our ethnic brothers, but now I’m starting to feel like they are foreigners.” An additional nine percent went so far as to say, “The North Koreans are as foreign as the Chinese.” It is often assumed that the biggest obstacles to reunification are the presence of two very different political systems and ideologies on either side of the border, and China’s influence on the North. However, the ultimate stumbling block to reunification may be a simple lack of will.[9]

          On the North Korean side, in a North Korean Social Change Survey conducted by the Institute for Unification and Peace in 2012 among North Korean defectors, the perception of reunification from North Korean defectors are very high compared to South Koreans, driven by factors including ethnic unity and idealistic expectations for an improved quality of life. It is to be noted that twenty percent of North Korean defectors said they were not satisfied with their lives in the South, troubled by cultural differences and economic barriers. Surprisingly, eighteen percent of the respondents said they regretted moving to the South, namely due to social prejudice and longing for their families and hometowns in the North.[10]

 

          The plight of Koreans separated by war: the human face of division

Chosen by computer lottery from the 116460 applicants of the Republic of Korea’s National Red Cross, 300 divided family members – in groups of 100 – won the right to meet their relatives during three-day visits to Pyongyang.[11] From the North, the same number – carefully selected, apparently on the basis of their perceived loyalty to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) – made up the three groups of 100 divided family members who visited the Republic of Korea’s capital, Seoul. The three exchange visits that took place on August 15, November 11, and February 26, 2001, are, to date, the most tangible result of the latest attempts at rapprochement between the two Koreas (Foley 2002, 120).[12]

Figure 2 showing Mr. Kim Sang-Il being interviewed by a journalist outside the Walker Hill Hotel as he waits with other divided family members not chosen to participate in the reunion. His poster reads: ‘Fellow countrymen from P’yongyang! Journalists! Please, if anybody knows, help find the following people who lived in Hadaeduri Refinery, Company Housing Number 7 in Namp’o P’yongan South Province, before the Korean War: father, Kim Won-Sik (96); mother, Yi T’ae-Suk (92); elder brother, Kim Sang-Ho (73); sister, Kim Son-Sil (60); brother, Kim Sang- Ch’on (57); brother, Kim Sang-Hyon (55). Kim Sang-Il, 148-2 Won Jong Dong, Ojong-Gu, Puch’on, Kyonggi Province. E-mail: sangill@yahoo.co.kr. Before I die, I must meet you and beg your forgiveness. Please find them.’ Photo credit, Foley 2002, 130 (see footnote 2001 meetings for details).

However, progress toward resolving the issue of Korea’s divided families has stalled. Proposals for a new round of exchanges fell on deaf ears, as did other attempts to persuade North Korean authorities to allow exchanges of correspondence. Other proposals have since been made by the Republic of Korea to hold a new round of meetings by President Moon Jae-in, but these have also been rejected.[13]

The popular enthusiasm of the 1990s for unification waned due to the frightening estimates of the costs of unification, which ranged from $250 billion to $3.5 trillion, depending on the study, as well as public complacency about the status quo of division (Nakato 2017, 65; Kim 2017, 90). South Korea has been busy with its own domestic agenda, while trying to deal with the North’s immediate threats of provocation, particularly from its nuclear and missile programs. In recent years, the two deadly incidents in the West Sea – the Cheonan ship (2010) and Yeonpyeong Island (2010) – have raised awareness of security threats in South Korea, providing a decisive impetus to consider trilateral military cooperation with Japan and the United States, at the cost of an angry response from the North and China (Hugh Lee 2010, 142; Kim 2017, 90).

          Japan

           Does Japan want Korea to remain divided? A more economically powerful South Korea or a more economically powerful and nationalistic unified Korea would not be welcome to Japanese conservatives, as either could hinder their goal of maintaining and, if possible, strengthening Japan’s international position. For example, it would make it harder for Japan to achieve its diplomatic goal of becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council (Kaseda 2017, 188) This goal, which the conservatives have long been striving for, has been difficult to achieve, in part because of China’s lack of support. The aforementioned transformation of South Korea would only add to this difficulty. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that conservative concern about a stronger South Korea resulting from rapprochement or a unified Korea is another reason why Japan has been reluctant to promote Korean rapprochement and unification.

            In the eyes of many Koreans, Japan seeks to reassert its hegemony and is therefore determined to prevent the consolidation of a neighboring state of seventy million people that could become an economic competitor and even a military adversary. This Korean perception assumes that Japan has arrived at an accurate assessment of its long-term interests and objectives in Korea and that it has consciously designed its policies to keep the peninsula divided (Kaseda 2017, 191). In reality, however, Japanese policies toward Korea have been and continue to be opportunistic, reactive and lacking in any long-term vision based on a clearly defined national consensus.

         North Korea: A Scenario of Collapse or a Gradual Reunification?

The responsibility for nuclear weapons

If North Korea is not denuclearized before its collapse, then the combined forces of North Korea and the United States will first have to safeguard and maintain control of nuclear weapons, facilities, materials and scientists upon reunification. The loss of control over nuclear weapons and materials poses a grave danger to the international community. Nuclear weapons and materials must be accounted for, facilities must be secured, and nuclear specialists must be rapidly protected and reemployed. It is essential to quickly identify which elements of North Korean society, if any, control nuclear weapons and to work with them to ensure accountability. A number of actors would be involved in cooperation, including North Korea, the United States, China and some countries in Europe like France (Henez 2017, IFRI, 5).

With an urgent need to safeguard nuclear weapons, the military can get involved. The U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) with South Korean support, or ROK SOF, would be ideal for such a task. Trained in unconventional warfare and possessing unique skills, they would be able to use speed, flexibility, and innovation in a counterproliferation mission.

China does not want U.S. military forces near its border; nor does it want uncontrolled nuclear weapons and related materials smuggled across its border. Because uncoordinated activities could lead to misunderstandings, Beijing, Washington and Seoul should coordinate on the nuclear issue before Pyongyang collapses. North Korea shares a border with Russia, and Japan can be reached by ship, so coordination with Russia and Japan would also be necessary.

Migration: Short-term migration and long-term migration

          In the event of a total collapse of institutions and law and order, North Koreans would probably migrate massively, mainly to China and South Korea, but also to Japan and Russia, and other countries. Initially, most North Korean emigrants may seek refuge in China because the Chinese border is easier to cross and the southern border is heavily mined and dangerous, although there are two corridors in the DMZ. The 850-mile-long border between North Korea and China is relatively easy to cross, and Korean-Chinese communities are located in the Yanbian Korean-Chinese Autonomous District and the three northeastern states of Liaoning-sheng, Jilin-sheng, and Heilongjang-sheng (Jian 2017, 128). China fears a massive movement of refugees into the country, and the People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police reportedly have plans to block refugees. China employs the PLA and PAP in the event of natural disasters. These forces are not trained to deal with large numbers of refugees, and if they were to develop such capabilities, it would likely be “crude and even cruel” (Jian 2017, 130). China may want to avoid the intervention of international agencies and NGOs within its borders, but this would likely prolong and exacerbate the problem. For this reason, organizations such as the UNHCR and others specializing in refugee management that operate on its borders would help alleviate the migration crisis.

North Koreans would also like to enter South Korea. The heavily mined DMZ between South and North Korea would make crossing the zone difficult, although there are roads connecting the two sides in the eastern and western corridors (O Tara 2016, 116). If command and control failed, the action of soldiers on the northern border would be unpredictable. Therefore, it would be dangerous to cross the border other than by the two roads. Although some may argue that the mines on the north-south border control migration, they would eventually have to be removed for Korea to unify. Mine removal is time-consuming and dangerous, but demining must be part of the plan (O Tara 2016, 118).

Mass migration would create significant social problems after unification. Northerners are unfamiliar with the economic, political and cultural systems and customs of the South. Communication is difficult because different words, especially foreign ones, are widely used in South Korea.

          To manage the situation, however, prior coordination with South Korea, the United States, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) could be helpful. The UNHCR could manage a predefined area in northern China to receive North Korean refugees, with the understanding that international efforts to stabilise North Korea would encourage the refugees to return home.

Unemployment, perhaps the greatest challenge

          Coping with the expected high unemployment rate will be essential to prevent mass migration and develop the economy. In a socialist economy, underemployment due to work in unproductive state enterprises is already a problem. State enterprises would not be viable in a collapsed system and the likely transition to a capitalist system. A more positive way to look at this issue is that North Korea would have an abundant supply of literate, low-cost, and disciplined workers, which would attract investors and might even trigger a growth spurt.[14]

Privatisation of northern industries should be carefully planned and phased to avoid sudden and massive layoffs, especially if workers have no other job prospects. On the other hand, privatisation that is too slow could also hamper development; without privatization, investment can be held back (O Tara 2016, 107).[15] At the micro level, investment introduces new competitive products and processes to the market. At the macro level, investment based on market principles rather than central resource allocation would be the means to restructure the sectoral and regional economy. Appropriate legislation to encourage investment and development would also be necessary.

Job creation is a key structural factor in improving migration. After the opening up of the economies of the former communist states, industries suffered from a loss of productivity due to inefficiency and reform, which increased unemployment and underemployment (O Tara 2016, 109). Public infrastructure is an area that can absorb many unemployed people, and North Korea’s infrastructure needs are enormous. There is a lack of adequate roads, railroads, communications infrastructure, energy networks, water systems and other networks. The scale of these projects means that this sector could provide jobs for many North Koreans, including those who have been demobilised from the North’s 1.2 million military (Joo 2017, 208). Improved infrastructure would also attract businesses, which could create additional jobs, and companies could relocate to take advantage of North Korea’s low labor costs.

The mineral wealth of the North

          Unlike resource-poor South Korea, which must import most of its mineral needs, North Korea is rich in raw materials, including coal, lead, tungsten, zinc, graphite, magnesite, iron ore, copper, gold, pyrites, salt, copper and fluorspar (O Tara 2016, 114). North Korea has large amounts of strategic minerals, including those needed for steel production. A 2016 geological survey by SRE Minerals Limited shows that North Korea may hold some 216 million tons of rare earth minerals, used in smartphones, high-definition televisions and other consumer electronics.[16] Currently, China, South Korea and Japan are the three largest importers of these minerals (O Tara 2016, 114).

          The need for a complete rebuilding of the industrial base can bring unforeseen benefits. Reconstruction can provide the basis for continued economic growth by reducing production costs, improving the skills of the workforce, and significantly increasing productivity. Although South Korea is cautious about the cost of unification, the benefits to Korea as a whole, at least in economic terms, could be substantial.

         The lessons of German unification

The experiences of Korea and Germany over the past half century have many similarities: the territorial division of traditionally rather homogeneous societies; the Cold War and its alliance systems and a sense of national identity deeply uprooted by war. The unification of Germany in 1990 provided Korea with an example of how unification can be achieved with some degree of success, as well as insights into the experiences that may follow eventual reunification (Kwak 2017, 20). No one in Germany – or anywhere else – expected this unification, and surprisingly, the external unification turned out to be easier than the internal one. The latter began when the East German government realized that it had no choice – short of the brutal use of force – but to push for the fastest and most complete takeover by West German institutions. The East German regime de facto threw in the face of democratic opposition and rushed into the arms of West Germany by promising to hold early free elections on March 18, 1990, only five months after the fall of the Wall (Carpenter 2004, 42). Since there was no language barrier between East and West Germany, the East German regime had no legitimacy when the Berlin Wall came down. Without the support of the Soviet Union and the Soviet military forces in Germany, who refused to support a regime they believed they could no longer afford to support, East Germany ceased to exist.[17] The result was an almost complete incorporation of East Germany into the West German system (Charles 2005, 170).

A “German-style” reunification, however, seems unlikely in Korea. In Germany, the external aspects of unification had been successfully managed through the 2+4 process, in which the two German negotiating partners had fully participated (Carpenter 2004, 90). The four powers – the United States, Britain, France, and Russia (or the Soviet Union until 1992) – had direct legal claims and responsibilities dating back to Germany’s surrender and subsequent postwar occupation, in particular the right to determine Germany’s final border and to conclude a peace treaty with her (Charles 2005, 171). In contrast, on the peninsula, the two Koreas are already fully sovereign and an international arrangement such as a four-power agreement to grant full sovereignty again will not be necessary in the event of Korean unification.

            It will take a long time for the standard of living in the North to be fully equal to that in the South. People must be prepared to accept a certain degree of inequality. It would be wrong to over-promise. However, the equality of North and South as a common goal of unification is essential. Nevertheless, economic and social equality is not the only criterion for unification. Even with a more developed economy and society, the level of equality in South Korea is not absolute equality of living conditions, which can only be a long-term goal. Living conditions differ to some extent within each social system (Jonsson 2006, 13).[18]

Korea will need international support for its unification and reconciliation process. Although the German 2+4 example is based on a different legal framework, a four-power procedure to guide Korea’s unification process would be most appropriate (Kim 2017, 89). The United States, China, Japan and Russia play important roles as crucial partners of the two Koreas. Defining Korea’s future international role and status through a 2+4 process could help make Korean unification more acceptable in the region (Kim 2017, 90). Since a unified Korea would be an important power in Northeast Asia, an effort to define its international role could only promote stability in the unification process.[19] Conversely, if the North does not collapse any time soon, other approaches to the study of Korean reunification should be examined.

A Vision for a reunified Korea through gradual unification

           What would be the means for gradual reunification, also known as the soft-landing scenario? Although no particular element of the study of unification has so far contributed to a successful resolution of the peninsula problem, the knowledge accumulated through ongoing research efforts is a valuable asset to the study of unification from which we can all learn useful lessons.

 The United Nations roadmap

         The possibility of dissolving the UN Command while retaining the Military Armistice Commission was considered by the United States in 1974. Henry A. Kissinger, as Secretary of State, formulated this concept in response to failed diplomatic attempts by the UN General Assembly to end the UN’s role in Korea. In a recently declassified National Security Council decision memorandum (No. 251, dated March 29, 1974), entitled “Termination of the UN Command in Korea,” Kissinger stated that the president had decided to request the substitution of the U.S. and South Korean military commanders for the commander of the UN command. South and North Korean representatives “should then become the principal members of the Military Armistice Commission,” and the UN command could be abolished (Joo 2017, 23).

For Lim Dong Won, the persistence of U.S. operational control so many years after the war is not only an affront to sovereignty but also an obstacle to constructive dialogue with the North. “South Korea must regain its independent identity as a key player in negotiations with North Korea,” Lim said. “This issue is intrinsically linked to the issue of the resumption of operational control of its military forces by the overall commander of the United Nations Command. Only with the return of operational control will North Korea respect and fear the South. Only then will North Korea truly respect the authority and capabilities of South Korea. If operational control is not returned to us, North Korea will continue to limit its approaches to the United States alone and exclude South Korea as its natural negotiating partner.”[20]

The South Korean government’s position is that operational control can only be safely returned “when the North Korean threat diminishes.” As long as the United States retains operational control, officials say, the United States will automatically be involved in the event of hostilities, and “we will have a guarantee of U.S. commitment and reinforcement on the basis of which we can make operational plans (Kim 2017, 87).” Conversely, the United States would be free to delay and limit its involvement if South Korea had operational control.[21]

From the perspective of most U.S. officials and military officers, it would be dangerous and unworkable for the United States to maintain forces in Korea without retaining operational control of them-dangerous because South Korea could overreact to North Korean provocations and draw the United States into an unnecessary conflict, and unworkable because it would be difficult to coordinate U.S. and South Korean forces without a single unified chain of command (Kwak 2017, 39). Logically, according to U.S. officials, a South Korean general could lead the current Combined Forces Command, but Congress would be loath to have U.S. troops fighting under a foreign command (Kwak 2017, 42).

More than forty years after Henry Kissinger made his proposal for a “Shanghai-type communiqué” linking a U.S. withdrawal to the reduction of tensions in Korea, the United States is more reluctant than ever to move in that direction. Yet for its part, North Korea, which was not ready for the Kissinger approach in 1975, is now in tune with it. In his speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on September 27, 1999, Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun said that the United States need only announce a “political decision” accepting the principle of eventual withdrawal as part of a negotiated process of tension reduction that could extend over an indefinite period. Should the United States decide to play a transitional broker or peacekeeper role in such a process,           Paek Nam Sun foresees unlimited possibilities. “The implementation of a new peace agreement,” he writes, “must determine whether U.S. forces should remain, leave, or be stationed in both Koreas.”[22]

Replace the Armistice

        On May 28, 1994, North Korea formally requested UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to take steps that would lead to the replacement of the armistice agreement and the termination of the UN commander’s mandate. Boutros-Ghali responded categorically on June 24 that the United States alone has the authority to decide on the continuation or dissolution of the UN Command (Kwak 2017, 24). In a detailed analysis of the many legal scenarios that have been proposed to end the Korean War, Patrick M. Norton, former legal advisor to the State Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, suggested a flexible approach that could include direct U.S. involvement. “Legally,” he argues, “a direct U.S. role would clearly be appropriate in light of Security Council Resolution 84V,” which refers to the U.S. role as a “unified command” in Korea, given its “direct command role in the fighting itself, and given its intimate political and military involvement in maintaining the armistice for over four decades.”[23]

Although it is often thought that the armistice should be replaced by a single “peace treaty,” Norton states that “form should not dictate policy, and there is no compelling reason why the Korean armistice could not be replaced by an agreement, or agreements, not expressly titled ‘treaty.’[24] Such an agreement or agreements could be submitted to the United Nations Security Council, which would pass a resolution confirming that they end the Korean War.

South Korea and North Korea could enter into a separate supplementary agreement unrelated to the armistice. The fact that the North and South do not formally recognise each other as sovereigns should not be an obstacle to this arrangement. Since the UN recognised them as sovereign states when it admitted them, the Security Council could confirm a North-South agreement as part of its resolution without legal difficulty. Seoul and Pyongyang could then refine the issue of sovereignty in the language of their agreement as they did in the 1991 Basic Agreement.[25] Other legal complications could be resolved if the political will is there.[26] For example, the fact that the signatories to the armistice signed as military commanders, not as heads of government, could be untangled by diplomatic exchanges between the governments concerned, which could then be annexed to the Security Council resolution. The key element of this formula is that the United States would sign a direct bilateral agreement with North Korea. So far, Pyongyang has rejected a direct North-South agreement, but its position would become more flexible if Washington agreed to sign a bilateral agreement with the North.

Conclusion

To conclude, whether Congress would support unification would depend on the agreement and politics at the time. It seems entirely plausible that support would exist for an appropriate agreement. On the flip side, it is plausible that Americans would turn against policies of extended deterrence when the protected state has the potential capability to defend itself, as does the ROK. That former President Trump expressed such a view should not discredit the point even with those of very different political persuasion. Extended deterrence is a very fragile reed. The issue of operational control remains important after decades of discussion. One might think that patriotic ROK citizens would insist on control. One might think that they would be willing to pay the bill to gain the equipment and competence needed.

Moreover, there are no good analogies to Korean unification because the DPRK has nuclear weapons and threatens to use them. It seems implausible that it would ever de-nuclearize. Even if it claimed to do so, who could believe that it had not held back some just for in-case purposes?  No other unification had such a problem. Whether other nations, China and Russia in particular, favor unification (and of what character) could change depending on other developments. In Korea itself, the generation gap showing how attitudes within the ROK have been changing and they vary with age group with younger South Koreans much more skeptical compared to North Korean defectors, might be another issue to tackle within the issue of reunification if it happens.

India’s neutral stance as solution to unification ?

India played a unique role throughout the Korean War, having no specific geo-political interests in the Korean Peninsula and maintaining a neutral position before and during the war years, yet believing in the reunification of the peninsula.[27] India still has the capacity to play a very strategic role in realising the dream of unification of Koreas. It can use its position of trust by both the countries to bring them closer. India has good relations with both North and South Korea. For example, trade ties between the three countries are booming as they aim for tri-lateral trade of fifty billion dollars by 2030.[28] Many million Koreans believe that their ancestors came from Ayodhya.[29] When President Roh moo-Hyun visited Delhi, he said, « We are cousins ». India has always maintained that any peaceful agreement between North Korea and South Korea will be strongly endorsed. In 2019, the Indian government declared full support for President Moon’s peace overtures to North Korea and offered to play a mediator role if its services are requested. It is still today prepared to go the extra mile to complete the unfinished task of ending the Korean War and peacefully unifying the Korean Peninsula.[30]

The fight for regional dominance continues to this day. And it is for this reason the two Koreas still find it very difficult to reconcile their differences and unify the country. If the Koreans do not move out of this quagmire – a Chinese-influenced unified Korea that is not acceptable to the US or a US-influenced unified Korea that is not acceptable to China – the Koreas may not unite for very long time. The complexity of the situation the two Koreas are in today shows the importance of countries that have no vested interest in the region but that would like the Korean Peninsula to be unified. It is time Koreans start taking the role of India in peace-building seriously. Thus, to conclude on that single word which means a lot, HOPE, the Korean reunification would be a momentous event in the region, affecting not only Korea, but also the interests and behaviors of the great powers worldwide. It is time collective efforts are made in that direction. Tomorrow may be too late.

Figure 3 showing in Paju, South Korea, the reunification monument to the 3rd tunnel aggression on the South Korean side on the border with North Korea in the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ), at https://media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/08/2003110666/-1/-1/0/221021-F-YT915-003.JPG, accessed 01/20/2022.

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[1] The Korean Peninsula was first divided along the 38th parallel north from 1945 until 1950 after the Second World War and then along the Military Demarcation Line from 1953 to present after the Korean War.

[2] For his well-documented book, see also Feffer John. 2003. North Korea/South Korea: U.S. policy at a time of crisis. New York. Seven Stories Press.

[3] For more reading, see https://www.pressenza.com/2023/04/its-high-time-the-us-signed-a-peace-treaty-with-north-korea/, accessed 05/04/2023.

[4] The task looks difficult because in a 2019 poll, U.S. voters considered the DPRK one of the countries posing the greatest threat to U.S. national security.

[5] Internet site,  https://www.visualcapitalist.com/us-largest-trading-partners-2022/, accessed 8/28/2023.

[6] For a detailed study of Chinese perspective, see Cai Jian. 2017. One Korea: Maintaining the status quo? New York. Routledge Press.

[7] Internet site for survey, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/2020_UBB_final.pdf, accessed 05/05/2022.

[8]    American economist Marcus Noland is one of the most frequently quoted sources for the cost of reunification, depending on the scope and the duration of financial investment and expenditures after reunification.

[9]  Internet site for survey, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/2020_UBB_final.pdf, accessed 05/05/2022

[10]      For a detailed survey, internet site with video, https://ipus.snu.ac.kr/eng/archives/events/7377#, accessed 09/30/2022.

[11] Internet site, https://www.redcross.or.kr/eng/eng_activity/activity_interkorean.do, accessed 09/30/2022.

[12] For a detailed study of the 2001 meetings, see Foley James. 2002. Korea’s Divided Families, Fifty Years of Separation. London. Routledge Press.

[13] For more information, internet site, https://www.voanews.com/a/inter-korean-family-reunions-display-unification-ties/3019793.html, accessed 09/30/2022.

[14] For more information, see https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3212547/the-potential-of-korean-unification-and-a-unified-korean-armed-forces-a-cultura/, accessed 05/09/2021.

[15] For a detailed study, see O Tara. 2016. The Collapse of North Korea: Challenges, Planning and Geopolitics of Unification. London. Palgrave Macmillan Press.

[16] Internet site for survey, https://www.usgs.gov/media/files/mineral-industry-north-korea-2016-pdf, accessed 03/15/2022.

[17] A similar situation occurred in Europe. The removal of Germany as a political and military player and the weakened positions of Britain and France after World War II meant that there was no European counterweight to the Soviet Union. By default, the United States moved in to fill that power vacuum. For a discussion of that process, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: W. W. Norton, 2001.

[18] See Jonsson Gabriel. 2018. Towards Korean Reconciliation: Socio-Cultural Exchanges and Cooperation. Chapter 2 on Lessons from German and Yemeni Unification. London. Routledge Press.

[19] Tong Kim presented his work entitled ‘Future vision for a unified Korean peninsula” at a Global Peace Conference in Seoul, August 17, 2012.

[20] Lim Dong Won is a retired South Korean politician who was a top aide during the administration of Kim Dae-jung and a key architect of the Sunshine Policy, holding the post of Unification Minister until September 3, 2001. He delivered a speech on March 3, 1999 for the above statements.

[21] Internet site, https://www.piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/economics-national-reconciliation, accessed 05/05/2021.

[22] Internet site, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/dprk-provocations-and-us-negotiations/, accessed 05/05/2021.

[23] The resolution passed in 1950 with the votes from the United Kingdom, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Cuba, Ecuador, France, Norway and the United States. The Soviet Union, a veto-wielding power, was absent because it was boycotting proceedings since January, in protest that the Republic of China and not the People’s Republic of China held a permanent seat on the council.

[24] For full article, internet site, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/napsnet-policy-forum-online-2-norton-ending-the-korean-armistice/#6, accessed 03/04/2022.

[25] In the early 1990s, the ROK and DPRK signed two historic documents— “Agreement on North–South Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Cooperation and Exchanges” (known as the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement) (1991) and the “Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” (1992). It behooves the two Koreas to comply with and to implement the provisions of the two historic agreements in good faith and, in doing so, creates favorable conditions for peace regime building on the Korean peninsula.

[26] Article 5 of the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement contains an important provision for establishing a peace regime in Korea:

The two sides shall endeavor together to transform the present state of armistice into a solid state of peace between the South and the North and shall abide by the present Military Armistice Agreement [of July 27, 1953] until such a state of peace has been realized.

[27] When the Korean War broke out India sent a medical team and made efforts for the armistice agreement. Later India chaired the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) for the repatriation of POWs. During the Cold War period India’s policy towards the Korean Peninsula was guided by non-alignment. After the end of the Cold War India initiated economic liberalization “Look East” policy which gave impetus to its renewed engagement with the Korean Peninsula. India has consistently urged North Korea to dismantle its nuclear missile programs has supported peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula. India’s deepening engagement with the two Koreas has been recognised by the United States it has been seeking India’s help in diffusing tensions in Korea.

[28] Internet site, http://www.ibtimes.com/why-does-india-have-relations-north-korea-213592, accessed 07/06/2023.

[29] For more information, see David Kim article, internet, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-023-01541-0, accessed 07/06/2023.

[30] Internet site, https://asiatimes.com/2020/07/indias-role-in-peace-building-on-korean-peninsula/, accessed 06/06/2023.

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